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The Exclusionary Rule in the Public School
Administrative Disciplinary Proceeding: Answering
the Question After New Jersey v. T.L.O.
Many view student discipline as the most significant problem facing
the public schools today.1 Although disagreement surrounds both the
definition of "discipline ' 2 and the extent of disorder and victimization 3 in
schools, the public is understandably concerned about what it perceives
to be a serious problem. The framework for disciplinary confrontations
between students and school officials is relatively constant even though
such confrontations may arise with infinite variety. A student's conduct
may violate a school regulation, 4 a criminal law, or both. In any case,
the student will likely face some form of administrative disciplinary pro1. Rossow, Administrative Discretion and Student Suspension: A Lion in Waiting, 13
J.L. & EDuc. 417,440 (1984); see G. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1980, at
177-78 (1980); G. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1979, at 227-28 (1979).
As used in this Note, "public school" means publicly funded elementary and secondary
schools. "Public school student" means a minor child attending a public school pursuant to
state and local entitlements to free public education and compulsory attendance laws. Every
state requires that children of certain ages attend school in one form or another. H. HUDGINS,
JR. & R. VACCA, LAW AND EDUCATION: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND COURT DECISIONS

§ 9.1, at 243-48 (2d ed. 1985).
2. See Oversight on School Discipline: Hearingsbefore the House Subcomm. on Elementary,Secondary and VocationalEducation of the Comm. on Education and Labor, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter cited as Oversight on School Discipline].
3. A Reagan Administration report describes an acute and growing disciplinary crisis as
a major cause of a dangerous public school environment and urges a freer hand for school
officials in restoring order. See Disorderin our Public Schools: Memo for the Cabinet Council
on Human Resources (1984). Some critics find these reports biased and overly pessimistic.
See, e.g., Oversighton School Discipline,supra note 2, at 8 (statement of Gary D. Gottfredson,
Ph.D., Director, Program in Delinquency and School Environments, Center for Social Organization of Schools, Johns Hopkins University) ("The best available evidence suggests no recent
dramatic increases or decreases in disorder in schools.").
One commentator argues for a broader, contextual analysis of the subject because statistics on school discipline are complex, difficult to obtain, and potentially misleading. Id. at 11819 (statement of Dr. Michael Casserly, Director of Legislation and Research, The Council of
the Great City Schools). For example, raw numbers are misleading: physical attacks against
282,000 students monthly amounted to only 1.3% of the students; forcible robberies of 112,000
students each month involved only 0.5% of the students; personal property theft from 2.4
million students per month included only 1I% of secondary school students. Id. at 118.
4. School regulations typically govern such matters as class attendance, use of personal
vehicles and parking lots, smoking on campus, profanity, student organizations and secret
societies, cafeteria use, off-campus dining, hallway traffic, and presence in the hallways during
class hours. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. 733, 763 n.16 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring
and dissenting). School regulations also may incorporate prohibitions against violation of state
and local civil and criminal statutes.
[1133]
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ceeding conducted by school officials. 5 This proceeding often will be perfunctory: the administrator responsible for discipline, upon receipt of a
credible complaint of student misconduct, will immediately impose a
sanction. 6 When the proposed sanction is exclusion from classes or from
all school activities, a more formal proceeding, though still far less than a
traditional trial, is required. 7 However, in cases of illegal conduct, the
student risks referral to law enforcement authorities and the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court or, in limited situations, to the criminal courts where
he may be tried as an adult.
Decisions affecting student discipline in the public schools traditionally have been made by officials on the state and primarily local level.8
Only within the last three decades have the federal courts departed significantly from their traditional deference to these state and local discipli5. "Public school administrative disciplinary proceeding" means whatever internal adjudicative-investigative forum the public school employs to determine the appropriate disciplinary response to a student's violation of a school regulation.
The primary disciplinary decision-makers are administrators and school boards, not
teachers. See Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate Student
Conduct and Status: A NonconstitutionalAnalysis, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 373, 385 n.46 (1969);
Teitelbaum, School Discipline Procedures: Some Empirical Findings and Some Theoretical
Questions, 58 IND. L.J. 547, 565 n.48 (1983).
6. Sanctions may take various forms: exclusion from extracurricular activities; corporal
punishment; grade reduction; suspension, a temporary loss of rights and benefits usually consisting of exclusion from all school activities; in-school suspension, a temporary exclusion from
classes but not from school premises; transfer to another school or academic program; and
expulsion, a permanent loss of all school rights and benefits. See H. HUDGINS, JR. & R.
VACCA, supra note 1, at 291-99; S. THOMAS, THE YEARBOOK OF SCHOOL LAW 1985, at 11218 (1986).
7. In such a case, a student is entitled to have time to prepare and present his case, to
have parents present, to examine evidence, and to refute testimony. He may also be entitled, in
some states, to summon and confront witnesses, to obtain a transcript of the hearing, and to
appeal an adverse decision. H. HUDGINS, JR., & R. VACCA, supra note 1, at 300-07; Kirp,
Proceduralismand Bureaucracy: Due Process in the School Setting, 28 STAN. L. REV. 841, 850
(1976) ("Except for suspensions of substantial duration, the procedure typically followed has
Longer suspensions were reviewed by the local board of education,
been perfunctory ....
whose function was primarily one of ratification. At no point did the student have a voice in
the proceedings.").
8. See Teitelbaum, supra note 5, at 547. The state establishes some standards of conduct, but delegates extensive disciplinary authority to local school boards. Note, Corporal
Punishment in Public Schools: A Violation of Substantive Due Process?, 33 HASTINGS L.J.
1245, 1249 (1982). The term "school board" is a generic term for the operating body of the
local school district. Goldstein, supra note 5, at 373 n.2. Most school boards are comprised of
nonprofessional community members, elected by citizens within the local school district. R.
GATTI & J. GATTI, NEW ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF SCHOOL LAW 311 (1983). They
are responsible for most decisions concerning the school-pupil relationship. School boards
express basic disciplinary policies either by promulgating formal rules or by issuing decisions
after reviewing the disciplinary actions of subordinate school officials on a case by case basis.
Thus, disciplinary actions of school officials and teachers are governed and circumscribed in
advance by explicit school board rules or by subsequent board ratification or disapproval.
Goldstein, supra note 5, at 385 n.46.
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nary decisions. 9 This federal action has expanded the recognized range
of individual constitutional rights and protections enjoyed by students. 10
Only rarely has the United States Supreme Court addressed school disciplinary issues. In those cases, the issues and fact patterns before the
Court have narrowly limited the general applicability of its decisions. As
a result, school officials face uncertainty about the legality of and their
personal liability for certain disciplinary practices not yet addressed by
any court. Similarly, students lack clear outlines of their substantive
rights and related procedural safeguards.I Clearly, any desirable resolution of school disciplinary issues must balance the need to maintain a safe
and orderly learning environment against the need to treat students
fairly.
New Jersey v. T.L. 0. 12 is one of the Court's most recent interventions in public school disciplinary matters. In that case, respondent was
9. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 744 n.9 (1985) (deferring, absent
violation of a constitutional guarantee, to local school officials' judgment that rules of conduct
are necessary to maintain order and proper educational environment); Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651 (1977) (severe corporal punishment practices implicated fourteenth amendment
liberty interest, id. at 674, but federal due process mandates withheld in deference to local
safeguards of public scrutiny and civil and criminal sanctions for abuse of disciplinary discretion, id., because federal directives would "entail a significant intrusion into an area of primary
educational responsibility." Id. at 682.); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)
("Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily
operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values."); Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899) (federal intervention declined where alleged racial discrimination failed to show "clear and
unmistakable disregard" of constitutional rights).
10. See Letwin, After Goss v. Loper- Student Status as a Suspect Classification 29
STAN. L. REv. 627 (1977). "Traditionally, children have been viewed either as the fortunate
beneficiaries of a paternalistic order or as adult property to be molded in accordance with the
values and interests of their parents or of the state." Id. at 627 n. 1. "During the past decade,
however, the courts, responding to changing social values, increasingly have been disposed to
view the constitutional rights of the young as prima facie coextensive with those of adults." Id.
at 627-28 (footnotes omitted).
Not surprisingly, state and local policy-makers, educators, and parents may find this federal intervention in school disciplinary matters to be unwanted, offensive, and an infringement
on their traditional domain. As one commentator noted: "Federal imposition of due process
requirements may be perceived as interfering with the character-shaping enterprise that most
schools consider a primary task, as casting doubt on the fairness of teachers and administrators, as impeaching the authority of school personnel, and as impeding maintenance of order in
the school." Teitelbaum, supra note 5, at 559 n.40 (citations omitted).
11. "The Supreme Court has proceeded in piecemeal fashion, applying the first amendment and the due process clause to the school situation." Letwin, supra note 10, at 629 (citation and footnotes omitted). For example, the Supreme Court in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975), stated that due process required "some kind of notice" and "some kind of hearing," id.
at 579 (emphasis in original), prior to imposing a suspension of 10 days or less. Id. at 584.
This type of decision clearly leaves many due process questions unanswered. For an examination of the manner in which, for example, the Indiana public schools have coped with this
judicial process, see Teitelbaum, supra note 5, at 548.
12. 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
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a freshman high school student who had been subjected to a warrantless
search of her purse by an assistant vice-principal. During the search, the
assistant principal uncovered evidence of marijuana possession and sale.
He referred plaintiff to the police, who instituted juvenile delinquency
proceedings. 13
The Court agreed to hear the case on the issue of whether the evi14
dence obtained should be admitted in juvenile court proceedings.
Although it never reached this question, the T.L. 0. Court held that the
mandates of the fourth amendment 15 apply to public school officials
when they conduct searches of students in their charge.' 6 T.L.O. is the
first case in which the United States Supreme Court has held public
school officials to be state officials within the meaning of the fourth and
fourteenth amendments.' 7 Prior to this decision, the courts generally
to whom parents had deleviewed school officials as private individuals
18
gated parental disciplinary authority.
T.L. 0. imposes a modified version of fourth amendment restrictions.
Because the Court perceived the need for immediate disciplinary action
in the school context, it waived the traditional search warrant requirement.19 For similar reasons,20the Court withheld the fourth amendment's
"probable cause" standard in favor of a more permissive standard,
which allows a school official to search a student when the official has
only a "reasonable suspicion" that a search will uncover evidence of pro2
hibited conduct. '
Although T.L.O. confirmed students' fourth amendment rights, the
means by which students may redress or deter violation of those rights
remains unclear. The T.L. 0. decision does not address the propriety of
13. Id. at 736-37.
14. Id. at 736.
15. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 741.

17. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. See infra notes 26-29 & accompanying text.
19. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 743.
20. "Probable cause" is the standard of reasonableness required for searches by law enforcement officers. It exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge
and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant
a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a criminal offense has occurred and that evidence
will be found in the suspected place. Id. at 752-53 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
21. Id. at 744; see infra note 63 & accompanying text.
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any particular recourse, 22 and the Court expressed concern that the issue
might arise in the context of a school administrative disciplinary proceeding. Therefore, we must look elsewhere for guidance on this issue.
For example, in criminal and certain civil proceedings, the most common
recourse is the judicially developed exclusionary rule,2 3 which prevents
the introduction of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. This Note addresses whether the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule should be extended to public school administrative disciplinary
proceedings.
It has generally been assumed that the exclusionary rule is available
to a student in a criminal or juvenile court proceeding to exclude evidence obtained by a school official's illegal search. 24 The T.L.O. Court,
however, did not indicate whether the exclusionary rule should be extended to the school disciplinary context. The few federal or state cases
that have addressed this issue provide no clear consensus. 25 However,
22. The court originally granted the petition for certiorari in T.L.O. only on the question
whether the exclusionary rule should operate in juvenile court proceedings to bar consideration of evidence unlawfully seized by a school official without the involvement of law enforcement officers. 105 S. Ct. at 738. The Court later ordered reargument on the issue of what
limits, if any, the fourth amendment places on the activities of school authorities. Id. Having
decided that the fourth amendment did impose limits, and that such limits had not been exceeded under the facts presented, id. at 738-39, the Court never reached the original issue, nor
did it indicate what remedy would be appropriate if a fourth amendment violation were found.
The Court expressly reserved the question of the applicability of the exclusionary rule "to the
fruits of the wrongful searches conducted by the school authorities." Id. at 739 n.3.
23. When evidence is obtained or produced by illegal means, its admission or other use in
a legal proceeding is erroneous and unconstitutional. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
638 (1886). Exclusionary rules "attend and vindicate" the first, fourth, fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments. Halvonik, Exclusionary Rules: An Introduction, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1057,
1057-58 (1982). The exclusionary rule, unlike the fourth amendment, is generally viewed as a
remedy, not a constitutional right. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974).
The rule is also intended to correct governmental conduct by deterring future fourth amendment violations.
24. Generally, those courts that have held school officials subject to the fourth amendment have also applied the exclusionary rule in criminal or juvenile court proceedings. See,
e.g., State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869, 871-72 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971) (criminal proceeding); State
v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317, 320 (La. 1975), vacated & remanded sub nom., Louisiana v. Mora,
423 U.S. 809 (1976), affd on remand, 330 So. 2d 900, 901 (La. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1004 (1976) (criminal proceeding); In re Dominic W., 48 Md. App. 236, 239, 426 A.2d 432,
434 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) (juvenile court proceeding); Doe v. State, 88 N.M. 347, 351-53,
540 P.2d 827, 831-33 (1975) (juvenile court proceeding); People v. Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d 483,
486, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403, 406, 315 N.E.2d 466,469 (1974) (criminal proceeding); see also Buss,
The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public Schools, 59 IOWA L. Rxv. 739,
741-42 n.20 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Buss, The FourthAmendment]. But see T.L.O., 105 S.
Ct. at 739 n.3 (Court "implies no particular resolution of the question of the applicability of
the exclusionary rule" to the fruits of unlawful searches conducted by school authorities).
25. See, eg., Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223, 227 (E.D. Tex. 1980)
(exclusionary rule available in high school disciplinary proceeding for marijuana possession
even though student not currently or potentially a criminal defendant); Morale v. Grigel, 422
F. Supp. 988 (D.N.H. 1976) (exclusionary rule not available in college disciplinary hearing for
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cases that have considered the exclusionary rule in other types of administrative proceedings indicate that the exclusionary rule is appropriate
when its application serves the rule's aims of deterring future violations
and promoting judicial integrity while maintaining a satisfactory balance
of social costs and benefits.
Accordingly, this Note argues that the exclusionary rule should apply to a limited category of public school administrative disciplinary proceedings. This category includes proceedings in which the student's
misconduct is chargeable as a crime and when the proposed sanction is
removal from school for more than ten days. The Note first briefly examines the United States Supreme Court's recent expansion of students'
constitutional rights. Next, the Note reviews the development of the exclusionary rule as a corollary of the fourth amendment. This development is examined in terms of the arguments commonly made for and
against application of the exclusionary rule in both criminal and civil
administrative proceedings. Finally, the Note argues that these aims and
principles favor extension of the rule to the limited category of public
school administrative disciplinary proceedings that may be described as
"quasi-criminal" and proposes guidelines for applying the rule in that
context. The Note concludes that the availability of the exclusionary
rule according to these guidelines will achieve an acceptable balance between the student's fourth amendment interests in personal privacy and
security and the school's interests in maintaining disciplinary discretion
and efficiency in a safe and stable educational environment.

The Expanding Recognition of the Constitutional Rights of
Public School Students
The in loco parentis doctrine 26 embodied the common-law view of
the legal status of minors in the public school setting. Under this doctrine, the school official stood in the place of the parent during school
hours and assumed the authority and responsibility of the parent in discimarijuana possession since student not actually or potentially a criminal defendant); Smyth v.
Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777, 794-95 (W.D. Mich. 1975) (exclusionary rule available in college
disciplinary proceeding for marijuana possession since conduct constituted a crime); Gordon J.
v. Santa Ana Unified School Dist., 162 Cal. App. 3d 530, 208 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1984) (exclusionary rule not applicable in high school disciplinary proceeding for marijuana possession because
administrative sanction intended primarily to prevent public harm, not to punish offender).
26. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *452-53:
[A parent has the power] by our English laws . . . [to] lawfully correct his child,
being under age, in a reasonable manner; for this is for the benefit of his education ....
... He may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the
tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis,and has such a portion
of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz. that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed.
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plinary matters. 27 The doctrine rested on the fundamental theory that
individual constitutional rights "mature and come into being magically
only when one attains the state-defined age of majority."2 8 The notion of
"student rights" was so contrary to prevailing attitudes that the courts
saw little need to affirmatively reject it and litigants rarely asserted it.29
The United States Supreme Court departed significantly from this
common-law view in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District30 when it struck down a school regulation prohibiting stu31
dents from wearing black armbands in protest of the Vietnam conflict.
School officials had enacted the regulation when they learned of the
planned protest. The regulation prohibited wearing the armband in
school and imposed a suspension that would terminate only when the
student agreed to comply. The students ignored the regulation, were suspended, and returned to school at the end of the planned protest period.
and filed a claim
The students alleged a deprivation of their civil rights
32
under federal law for damages and an injunction.

In striking down the regulation, the Court confirmed the first
amendment free expression rights of public school students. The Court

spoke broadly of students' constitutional rights which, in the Court's
33
much quoted phrase, are not "shed ... at the schoolhouse gate":
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in school as well as out of school are "persons" under

27. The related doctrine of parens patriae provided the state the right to intervene in
place of the parent. In this view, the child had a basic right "not to liberty but to custody."
Shears, Legal Problems Peculiarto Children'sCourts, 48 A.B.A. J. 719, 720 (1962), quoted in
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 n.21 (1966). In In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 17 n.21, the Court
explained:
If his parents default in effectively performing their custodial functions-that is, if
the child is "delinquent'-the state may intervene. In doing so, it does not deprive
the child of any rights, because he has none. It merely provides the "custody" to
which the child is entitled. On this basis, proceedings involving juveniles were described as "civil" not "criminal" and therefore not subject to the requirements which
restrict the state when it seeks to deprive a person of his liberty.
28. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
29. Letwin, supra note 10, at 631.

30. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
31. Id. at 513-14.
32. Id. at 504.
33. Id. at 506. Professor Letwin points out that Tinker was the first time that the United
States Supreme Court "acknowledged that rights were something that students unambiguously
possessed rather than fictional devices used to justify adult manipulation of children."
Letwin, supra note 10, at 633 (footnote omitted). For example, West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), struck down a school regulation requiring a minor
Jehovah's Witness to participate in a flag salute and pledge of allegiance, finding it an unconstitutional invasion of the first amendment freedom of belief of plaintiff parents and their children. In Tinker, however, the Court viewed Barnette as having protected the students'
constitutional rights independently of their parents. 393 U.S. at 507.
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our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the
State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State .... In the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their34speech, students are entitled to
freedom of expression of their views.
Further erosion of the common-law view occurred in Goss v. Lopez, 35 which addressed students' due process rights in school suspension
proceedings. Plaintiffs were public high school students who had been
suspended from school, without a hearing, for periods of up to ten days.
Their class action suit sought a declaration that the state statute allowing such action was unconstitutional and an injunction forbidding the
school from recording the disciplinary action in its files. 36 The Goss
Court found that the students plainly had a property interest in the statecreated entitlement to a public education 37 and a liberty interest in their
"good name, reputation, honor, or integrity. ' 38 The Court found protection for these interests in the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause. 39 Because the Court recognized a significant risk of factual error
in the school's determination that the alleged misconduct had actually
occurred, it held that a school could not constitutionally deprive a student of these interests on the grounds of misconduct unless its fact-find4°
ing procedures were fundamentally fair and not arbitrary.
Against the need to avoid this risk of error and the need to protect
students' due process rights, the Goss Court balanced the need to maintain order and discipline in the educational environment41 and the effectiveness of suspension as a "valuable educational device."' 42 Further, the
34. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511. Tinker established that a school regulation of student expression is unconstitutional if it cannot be justified "by a showing that the student's activities
would materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school." Id. at 513.
35. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
36. Id. at 567.
37. Id. at 574.
38. Id. at 574-75 (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)).
39. Goss, 419 U.S. at 572-74.
40. Id. at 581. Goss reserved considerable discretion in the fact-finding school official as
to the extent of investigation and the determination of cause and effect between the student's
behavior and the alleged misconduct. Id. at 584.
41. Id. at 580; see also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 189 (1972) (students' right to freedom from substantial interference with educational environment).
42. 419 U.S. at 580; see also id. at 593 (Powell, J., dissenting) (Discipline "provides an
early understanding of the relevance to the social compact of respect for the rights of others.").
For commentary by professional educators who dispute this view, see infra note 163. The
Court was also concerned with preventing the diversion of valuable school resources from the
educational to the administrative-adjudicatory function, 419 U.S. at 583, and preventing the
escalation of the formal, adversarial nature of the suspension process, which would disserve
the interests of both the state and the public school students. Id. at 593 (Powell, J., dissenting).
But see Letwin, supra note 10, at 644 ("The interest of school officials in job advancement,
political approval, county funds, peer recognition, ego gratification, or a work atmosphere free
of student 'disrespect' is not necessarily in the child's interest.").
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Goss Court formulated the procedural safeguards to which the students
were entitled in accordance with this balance of interests. The Court
found guidance in its own prior admonitions that application of the due
process clause was an "intensely practical" matter, requiring flexibility,
care, and restraint. 43 Accordingly, Goss held that, before a student can
be suspended for ten days or less, due process requires "that the student
be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an
opportunity to present his side of the story." 44 These requirements were
admittedly rudimentary and called for minimal formality. 4 5 In effect,
Goss left factual investigation and advocacy of student interests entirely
within the discretion of the school official.
46
Because suspensions of ten days or less are frequent occurrences,
the application of full-scale due process procedures in each case might
prove to be an overwhelming administrative burden in many schools.
Therefore, the Court declined to impose trial-type procedures, such as
the opportunity for legal counsel or the calling or confrontation of witnesses. 47 However, the Goss Court expressly restricted its opinion to suspensions of ten days or less and did not delineate what procedures would
be required in disciplinary proceedings imposing more serious
48
sanctions.
43. Goss, 419 U.S. at 576.
44. Id. at 581. In the great majority of cases, this requirement may be satisfied by an
informal discussion with the student minutes after the alleged misconduct. Id. at 582. As a
general rule, the notice and hearing must occur before the student is removed from school,
unless his continued presence poses a danger to persons or property, or threatens the educational process. Id. The existence of such a threat justifies immediate removal, followed as
soon as practicable by the required notice and hearing. Id. at 582-83.
45. Id. at 584.
46. Suspension has long been the primary formal disciplinary action. Teitelbaum, supra
note 5, at 555. A witness before the United States House of Representatives in 1984 stated:
The proportions of students suspended is surprising. I doubt that official estimates of
the numbers of suspensions reflect reality. Many schools have developed ways to get
around calling a removal of a student from school a suspension: Terms like "disciplinary removal" and "home study" are created. In some surveys we conducted in
1982 ....
[o]verall, 17% [ranging from 4% to 62% in different schools] of the students [said they had been suspended in the past school term].... [A]s high as these
figures are, they are even higher for some groups of students than others [according
to gender and minority].... [These schools] are not unduly fettered-undoubtedly
many of these students were removed more than once.
Oversight on School Discipline,supra note 2, at 28-31 (statement of Gary Gottfredson). Other
disciplinary measures also achieve student "removal" without coming under the rubric of
"suspension" and its associated regulations, such as transfer to other schools or programs and
"in-school suspension." Teitelbaum, supra note 5, at 550.
47. Goss, 419 U.S. at 583.
48. However, the Goss opinion expressly recognized the possibility that more severe sanctions could require more formal procedures:
We should also make it clear that we have addressed ourselves solely to the short
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Goss marked a critical turning point in the development of student
rights. It was a small but promising step away from the Court's traditional attitude toward the rights of children and minor students. Despite
the Court's narrow holding and the limited protective potential of the
procedural requirements imposed upon school disciplinary actions, Goss
provoked a strong fear of unbridled judicial interference in other matters
in which local school officials traditionally had exercised wide discretion.4 9 In fact, this fear has not been vindicated, as the Court has not
expanded the due process requirements initiated by Goss, despite several
opportunities to do so.50
The Court, however, has "put teeth" into Goss by recognizing a federal cause of action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for damages against
51
school officials who knowingly violate Goss' due process mandates.
The reach of section 1983 extends so far as to allow review of the admis52
sibility of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment.
However, section 1983 may have insignificant remedial value in this context for several reasons. First, a student may be unaware that Goss provides him the right to notice and the opportunity for a hearing. Second,
even if he is aware of his rights, various factors may lead him to waive
suspension, not exceeding 10 days. Longer suspensions or expulsions for the remainder of the school term, or permanently, may require more formal procedures. Nor
do we put aside the possibility that in unusual situations, although involving only a
short suspension, something more than the rudimentary procedures will be required.

Id. at 584.
49. The Goss dissent warned of a "thicket" of such interferences, such as in the grading of
schoolwork, promotion to higher grade levels, participation in extracurricular activities, class
selection, and choice of school. Id. at 597 (Powell, J., dissenting).
50. See University of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 86 n.3 (1978) (deferring to the historical discretion of educators in matters of academic performance and related penalties); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680 (1977) (imposing a procedural due process requirement
"would significantly burden the use of corporal punishment as a disciplinary measure").
51. A citizen may invoke § 1983 in an action against state officials who act "under color
of state law" to knowingly deprive a citizen of his constitutional rights. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-18 (1982) ("[G]overnment officials . . . are shielded from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308 (1975).
52. Wood v. Strickland expressly held that § 1983 did not provide the right to relitigate
either evidentiary questions arising in school disciplinary proceedings or the proper construction of school regulations. 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975); see, e.g., Board of Educ. v. McCluskey,
662 F.2d 1263 (8th Cir. 1981), rev'd per curiam, 458 U.S. 1132 (1982) (deferring to school
board's interpretation of school regulation); Boynton v. Casey, 543 F. Supp. 995, 999 (D. Me.
1982) (same). However, § 1983 could be invoked where the exercise of that discretion violated
specific constitutional guarantees. Thus, the admissibility in school disciplinary proceedings of
evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment is a question which would come within
the reach of § 1983. McCluskey, 662 F.2d at 1263; see, e.g., Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462
(9th Cir. 1984) (search of fifth grade students for drugs); Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist.,
499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980) (use of drug-sniffing dogs on junior high and high school
students).
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them. For example, he may lack the will to endure the disapproval of
school officials and the other social costs of a challenge to school authority.5 3 He may find the financial cost of litigation prohibitive.5 4 The
school officials also may have a credibility advantage. Finally, the student may have difficulty proving that the official acted "under color of
state law," an essential element of the cause of action. 5
The Fourth Amendment: New Jersey v. T.L. 0.
Sixteen years after recognizing students' first amendment right to
freedom of expression in Tinker, and ten years after recognizing their
fourteenth amendment due process rights in Goss, New Jersey v. T.L. 0.56
established students' fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by school officials. T.L.O. was a fourteen-yearold high school freshman accused by a teacher of violating a school regulation against smoking cigarettes in the lavatory. T.L.O. was taken to
the assistant vice-principal, to whom she denied the charge and denied
ever smoking at all. At that point, the assistant vice-principal took
T.L.O.'s purse, looked inside, and found a package of cigarettes. Upon
removing the package to present it to her, he saw marijuana-related items
in the purse. This discovery prompted a thorough search of the purse,
during which the principal read private letters and papers implicating the
student in the sale of marijuana. Accordingly, the principal referred her
to law enforcement authorities, who instituted juvenile court
57
proceedings.
The fourth amendment rights recognized in T.L. 0. rest, in part, on
the finding that school officials are state agents. 58 T.L.O. expressly rejected the in loco parentis doctrine under which the common law had
viewed school officials as private individuals acting pursuant to a delegation of parental authority in disciplinary matters.5 9 The Court refused to
distinguish the school officials' status in this fourth amendment context
from their status as state agents in the first and fourteenth amendment
contexts.
As it did in Goss v. Lopez,60 the Court in T.L.O. emphasized the
special needs of the school for immediacy and efficiency in the mainte53. See Buss, Implications of Goss v. Lopez and Wood v. Strickland for Professional
Discretionand Liability in Schools, 4 J.L. & EDUc. 567, 574 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Buss,

Implications] ,quoted in Teitelbaum, supra note 5, at 568 n.50.
54. This burden may be offset by the attorney fees available to successful litigants under
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
55. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
56. 105 S.Ct. 733 (1985).
57. Id. at 736-37.
58. Id. at 741.
59. Id.; see supra notes 26-32 & accompanying text.
60. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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nance of an orderly, safe, and stable learning environment. When balanced against the student's interest in personal privacy and security,
these needs justified providing weaker fourth amendment protections
than those provided to adults. 61 Accordingly, the traditional "probable
cause" standard 62 yielded to one of "reasonable suspicion":
Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or
other school official [acting alone and on his own authority and not in
conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies] will be
"justified at its inception" when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such a
search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively
intrusive in63light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the
infraction.
In explaining its adoption of the less demanding "reasonable suspicion" standard, the majority noted that "focusing attention on the question of reasonableness ... will spare teachers and school administrators
the necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause
and permit them to regulate their conduct according to the dictates of
reason and common sense."' 64 In formulating this standard, the Court
exhibited remnants of its traditional deference in declining "to adopt a
standard under which the legality of a search is dependent upon a judge's
evaluation of the relative importance of various school rules."' 65 However, the Court held that "the nature of the infraction" was relevant to
the reasonableness of the intrusion. 66 Thus, T.L.O. is ambiguous as to
the importance of the nature of the alleged violation. While holding that
the legality of the search does not depend on the "relative importance"
of the rule, the opinion instructs that the reasonableness of the search,
and hence its legality under the new standard, depends in part on the
61. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 743. A balancing test of costs and benefits is commonly applied
by the Court before imposing the exclusionary rule. See infra text accompanying notes 116-17.
This Note proposes that the nature of the rule or law violated should be included in that
balance.
62. See supra note 20.
63. 105 S. Ct. at 744 (citations omitted).
64. Id. Other members of the Court rejected this rationale. "I cannot but believe that
the same school system faced with interpreting what is permitted under the Court's new 'reasonableness' standard would be hopelessly adrift as to when a search may be permissible." Id.
at 756-57 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
65. Id. at 744 n.9. Some justices declined to accord such deference to school authorities.
"[W]hen minor violations are involved, there is every indication that the informal school disciplinary process, with only minimum requirements of due process, can function effectively without the power to search for enough evidence to prove a criminal case." Id. at 763. (Stevens, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
66. Id. at 744.
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67
nature of the infraction.
Despite its imperfections, T.L.O. established another vital link in the
framework of students' constitutional rights. State violations of these
rights may be grounds for a cause of action under the federal Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. section 1983.68
The recourse available to students for school officials' fourth amendment violations is less clear, because the issue has not often been considered by the courts. Court decisions in other contexts reveal that the
primary tool for the protection of fourth amendment rights has been the
exclusionary rule. To determine whether this tool, ordinarily applied in
criminal proceedings, could or should be available in the public school
disciplinary proceeding, it is necessary to understand its origins, purposes, and past applications in criminal and noncriminal proceedings.

Traditional Applications of the Fourth Amendment's
Exclusionary Rule
Possibly "no issue in the area of criminal law and procedure has
spurred more controversy than the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule." 69 The Constitution contains no textual provision for it. Rather,
the exclusionary rule is a judicial creation, sustained by the Court's interpretations of the fourth amendment's guarantee of freedom from unreasonable governmental intrusions into personal privacy and security. 70
At common law, all relevant and competent evidence, regardless of
the manner in which it was obtained, was admissible in a criminal proceeding. 7 1 The earliest courts departing from this view objected to coerced production of incriminating evidence on two constitutional
grounds: the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable
seizures and the fifth amendment prohibition against compulsory self67.

In another case involving the application of the fourth amendment in a civil context,

the Court determined reasonableness-and thus constitutionality-by balancing the need for

the search against the severity of the intrusion. Implicitly, the need for the search was at least
in part a function of the nature of the suspected infraction. See Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967) (inspection of area residences by city health department investigators without reason to expect code violations at particular residence).
68. See supra notes 51-55 & accompanying text.
69. Schroeder, DeterringFourthAmendment Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary
Rule, 69 GEO. L.J. 1361 (1981). The Court has also been sharply divided on the continuing
development of the rule. See, eg., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 n.15 (1976).
70. The fourth amendment was inspired mainly by the evils and abuses of the general
warrant and writ of assistance as practiced by English colonial rulers. For general historical
background, see N. LASSON, THE

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMEND-

(1937); Stewart (Associate Justice, United
States-Supreme Court), The Road to Mapp v. Ohio andBeyond: The Origins,Development and
Futureof the ExclusionaryRule in Search and Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 136971 (1983).
71. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482-83 n.19 (1976).
MENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTrrUTION
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recent years, the Court has abandoned this
incrimination. 7 2 In more
"convergence theory."' 73 Instead, the exclusion of illegally obtained eviwhen
dence is now justified solely on fourth amendment grounds, even
74
the evidence has been obtained without coercion or compulsion.
As the law developed, the Court rejected technical distinctions in
the procedure by which a defendant must object to the admission of
tainted evidence; he need only make a motion or objection before or during trial. 75 Similarly, the Court rejected procedural technicalities in the
government's use of illegally seized evidence, bluntly declaring that, not
only may such evidence not be used before the court, it may not be used
at all. 76 Distinctions concerning the nature of the evidence also gave way

analysis focusing on the manner in which the evidence
to an exclusionary
77
was obtained.

The exclusionary rule had long been imposed only in actions against
federal officials. This limitation grew largely out of a general deference
to states' individual determinations of the most appropriate recourse for
79
78
It was not until 1961, in Mapp v. Ohio,
fourth amendment violations.

that the Court firmly imposed the exclusionary rule upon the states and
state officials. The Court's recent decision in New Jersey v. TL. 0.80
placed public school officials within the reach of the Mapp ruling.
As the Court has examined the wisdom and necessity of an exclusionary rule, three main considerations emerge from the cases. 8 ' First,
72. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); cf Adams v. New York, 192
U.S. 585 (1904) (rule not applied where no compulsion).
73. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 472 n.6 (1976).
74. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (fourth amendment would
be of no value as a protection against unreasonable searches and seizures if evidence so obtained could be used against the victim of an unreasonable governmental search).
75. See, e.g., Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1921) (motion at trial);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (pre-trial petition).
76. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (forbidding use of
duplicated evidence after return of originals to defendant).
77. Schroeder, supra note 69, at 1363-64; see, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438 (1928); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Amos v. United.States, 255 U.S. 313
(1921).
78. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-33 (1949) (rejecting blanket imposition of
rule on states). But cf Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (mandatory application
of rule when state officials' due process violation "shocks the conscience").
79. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
80. 105 S.Ct. 733 (1985).
81. This Note limits its discussion to these three considerations to which the Court and
commentators have directed primary attention. It should be noted, however, that some have
espoused, with less success, additional bases for the rule. Justice Brennan, for example, views
the exclusionary rule as inherent in the fourth amendment as a necessary enforcement tool.
See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 460 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 356 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Under this view, the
rule is constitutionally required regardless of its deterrent effect. Id.
Commentators have argued that the exclusionary rule serves multiple functions. First,
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the exclusionary rule may deter government officials from future fourth
amendment violations. Second, it may be a valuable means to maintain
and promote judicial integrity. Third, the rule must be applied only when
it will achieve a satisfactory balance of social costs and benefits. Over the
years, the weight accorded to each of these factors has reflected changes
in policy concerns 8z and in the membership of the Court. This section
examines these considerations as developed in both criminal and certain
civil administrative proceedings.
Applications of the Exclusionary Rule in the Criminal Context
Deterrence of Future Fourth Amendment Violations

Deterrence of future fourth amendment violations is currently 83 the
primary rationale for imposing the exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings. 84 Several modes of deterrence must be distinguished. 85 First, deterrence can be specific, by directly affecting the individual personally
involved in the illegal evidence gathering.8 6 Application of the exclusionary rule would theoretically cause specific deterrence when it results in
direct and individualized detriment to an offending government official's
the rule expresses the judiciary's constitutional regulatory power and provides an occasion for
judicial development of partial codes of lawful conduct and civil liberties through the adversarial process. Third, it provides an incentive and a process for defense attorneys to challenge
existing practices. Fourth, the rule educates by improving both public and governmental
awareness of and sensitivity to civil liberties and to the proper limits of governmental activities.
Fifth, it serves as a partial remedy, as it is the only device that can return the search victim to
his pre-search condition. Sixth, the rule deters future fourth amendment violations. See generally Goodpaster, An Essay on Endingthe ExclusionaryRule, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1065, 1076-77
(1982); Schroeder, supra note 69, at 1373-78.
82. "[T]he policies behind the exclusionary rule are not absolute. Rather, they must be
evaluated in light of competing policies." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488 (1976). These
policies include the public interest in ascertaining the truth, punishing crime, and deterring
invasion of individual privacy and security.
83. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), was the first case to "introduce the notion of
deterrence [of official illegality] into the debate concerning the wisdom of the exclusionary
rule." McKay, Mapp v. Ohio: The Exclusionary Rule and the Right of Privacy, 15 Aiz. L.
REV. 327, 330 (1973). Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), was the first case to state
explicitly that the purpose of the rule-as opposed to its effect-was deterrence. Schroeder,
supra note 69, at 1374.
84. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446
(1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S.
244, 254 n.24 (1969). However, the deterrence principle is not so potent that it compels the
Court to adopt every proposal that might deter fourth amendment violations by law enforcement officials. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969). The exclusionary rule
is a remedial tool and its application is "restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives
are thought most efficaciously served." United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974);
see supra note 23 (rule as remedy).
85. See Note, OSHA and the ExclusionaryRule: The Cost of ConstitutionalProtection, 19
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 819, 836 (1983).

86. Id.
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personal or financial interests.8 7 For example, the official may have a
direct professional interest in the outcome of the proceeding in which
illegally obtained evidence is offered8 8 or be subject to internal professional sanctions. 89 Accordingly, the Court's recent opinions have analyzed the probabilities of specific deterrence as a function of the official's
"zone of primary interest." 90
Second, deterrence can be general, by directly and personally affecting all individuals in the evidence-gathering organization. 9 1 Finally, deterrence can be systemic, by causing the administrators of the evidencegathering organization to promulgate rules, guidelines, and training programs for the regulation of all its members. 92 Promulgation of effective
93
rules depends on the organization's access to current judicial guidelines
and its willingness to value legal propriety above collegial loyalties and
94
expediency.
The Court has frequently been less than explicit concerning which
mode of deterrence it prefers. Although the cases seem to favor general
deterrence, all three modes have found acceptance. 95 In any case, the
87. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV.
665, 725 (1970).
88. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[E]xcept that apprehending wrongdoers is their business, police
have no more stake in successful prosecutions than prosecutors or the public.").
89. According to Professor Oaks, no law enforcement agency ties individual sanctions to
application of the exclusionary rule. Oaks, supra note 87, at 710. Apparently, officers are
rarely disciplined even when their conduct results in judgments against them or their employer. Project, Suing The Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L. J. 781, 810-14 (1979).
90. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 3492 (1985) (White, J., dissenting)
(civil deportation proceeding within INS arresting officer's zone of primary interest since his
primary objective is use of evidence in that proceeding); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,
458 (1976) (exclusion in federal civil proceeding causes no marginal specific deterrence of state
police officer since federal civil proceeding is outside his primary zone of interest and officer
was already punished by exclusion of evidence from state proceeding). Similarly, one commentator has argued that effective deterrence depends upon the searcher's strong interest in
obtaining convictions and upon his conduct of searches with sufficient regularity to allow familiarity, and ultimately conformity, with the rules. See Note, Seizures by Private Parties:
Exclusion in Criminal Cases, 19 STAN. L. REV. 608, 614-15 (1967).
91. See Note, supra note 85, at 836.
92. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 3487-88 (1985) (internal rules
governing stop, interrogation, and arrest practices).
93. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 31, 33 (1967), cited in Schroeder,
supra note 69, at 1381 n. 160 ("Police administrators often have to rely primarily on newspapers to learn of judicial decisions, even those involving their own officers.").
94. See Schroeder, supra note 69, at 1381-82 (conduct of official organizations may be
influenced more by peer group pressure, situational needs, and disdain for the judicial system
than by judicial exclusion of illegally obtained evidence).
95. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 3487-90 (1984) (slight general
deterrence when few arrestees demanded formal hearing, slight specific deterrence when arresting officer, rarely attended formal hearing or learned its results, slight margin for systemic
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essential aim of the deterrence rationale is some tangible-or at least theoretically probable or measurable-benefit in exchange for the risk of
letting the guilty go free. 96 The scarcity of empirical data on actual deterrent effects makes analysis of this issue speculative and highly controversial. 97 As the cases have developed, the Court's focus on deterrence
has undergone a transformation. The Court previously expressed deterrence considerations in terms of purpose and justified the exclusionary
rule as a means to remove the incentive to violate the fourth amendment. 98 Recent decisions, however, emphasize deterrent effect and withhold the rule in the absence of a substantial probability of a significant
increase in actual deterrence. 99 The Court measures deterrent effect "at
the margin"; 1°° that is, application of the exclusionary rule must cause
deterrence in addition to that which already arises by other means. 10 '
This deterrence analysis tends to focus upon probable deterrent effect rather than upon the invasion of fourth amendment rights.10 2 The
deterrence due to comprehensive internal regulatory scheme and sufficient alternative legal
remedies); see also United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3419 (1984) (no effective deterrence
absent alteration of individual behavior or departmental policies); Dunaway v. New York, 442
U.S. 200, 221 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring) (exclusionary rule unjustified unless it motivates
"profession as a whole-not the aberrant individual"); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 347-48 (1974) (implied preference for general deterrence).
96. See Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins ofStrainingthe Constitution Through a Pseudo-Scientific
Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155, 157-58 (1984). This provocative essay criticizes the Court's reliance on social, economic, and scientific theories and statistics in deciding constitutional issues.
97. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 449-53 (1975). Any reliable study would
necessarily reflect a substantial number of variables, many of which cannot be measured or
controlled. Id. at 450-51. For examples of the most frequently cited empirical studies, see
Oaks, supra note 87; Spiotto, Search andSeizure: An EmpiricalStudy of the ExclusionaryRule
and its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973). Notwithstanding these studies, public perception that the exclusionary rule allows the guilty to go free may be more important than
actual statistics. Schroeder, supra note 69, at 1384.
98. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) ("The rule is calculated to
prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it.").
99. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 3486 (1984) ("deterrent value" is
measurable likelihood that actual constitutional violations will be reduced); United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1975) ("If... the exclusionary rule does not result in appreciable
deterrence, then, clearly, its use ... is unwarranted."); see also Halvonik, supra note 23, at
1062 (distinguishing between removal of incentive and deterrence).
100. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 3488 (1984).
101. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453 (1975).
102. See Schrock & Welsh, Upfrom Calandra: The ExclusionaryRule as a Constitutional
Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REv. 251, 275 n.78 (1974) (This focus in effect "makes the [fourth]
amendment over in the image of the exclusionary rule") (citation omitted); see also Tribe,
supra note 96, at 156-58, 166-67 (criticizing Court's emphasis on measurable effects rather
than on invasion of fourth amendment interests).
It is well settled that the exclusion issue in a given case is separate from the issue of
whether a claimant's fourth amendment rights were violated. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct.
3405, 3412 (1984).
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inevitable problem with this analysis is that it leaves a number of violations neither punished nor deterred. For example, there is no deterrent
effect when the illegal intrusion was intended for reasons other than ultimate prosecution, 103 when the illegally obtained evidence is not intended
for use against the search victim, °4 or when the illegal search has produced no evidence. 10 5 In these situations, the deterrence analysis does
little to vindicate individual fourth amendment interests in privacy and
security from unreasonable governmental intrusions. It is the fourth
amendment, not the exclusionary rule, that places restraints on the evidence-gathering activity of government officials. 106
Maintenance and Promotion of Judicial Integrity

The exclusionary rule also has been justified as a means to maintain
10 7
and promote judicial integrity. The "imperative of judicial integrity"'
generally refers to the need for the judiciary to refrain from associating
itself with and thus apparently approving governmental use of illegally
obtained evidence in a criminal prosecution. °8 The essential aim of the
judicial integrity principle is to maintain public respect for and trust in
the judiciary, the law, and government. 0 9 Some commentators have
suggested that it also discourages the totalitarian philosophy that the end
justifies the means. 110
As with the deterrence rationale, the judicial integrity principle rests
103. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968) (official stop and limited frisk for
weapons permissible to ensure officer's safety). Other purposes include the creation of a public
image of active law enforcement, Schroeder, supra note 69, at 1380; Wingo, Growing Disillusionment with the Exclusionary Rule, 25 Sw. L.J. 573, 577 (1971), recovering stolen property,
removing weapons or contraband such as drugs from circulation, uncovering weapons that
might be used against the searching officer, or simply harassing and inconveniencing the victim
of the search. Schroeder, supra note 69, at 1380 n.150. One commentator has categorized
these objectives as authority maintenance, self-protection, information, and harassment. Milner, Supreme Court Effectiveness and the Police Organization, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
467, 476 (1971).
104. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969).
105. Schroeder, supra note 69, at 1379-80.
106. Even if the exclusionary rule were abolished, government officials would still be
bound by the mandates of the fourth amendment. This is the price the framers anticipated and
were willing to pay to ensure the sanctity of the person, home, and property against unrestrained governmental power. Stewart, supra note 70, at 1393.
107. Elkins v United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) (Stewart, J.). Justice Stewart has
since written that he did not intend this phrase to imply that judicial integrity is a constitutional basis for the exclusionary rule. Stewart, supra note 70, at 1382 n.2.
108. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(need is to avoid the "taint of partnership in official lawlessness").
109. "If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
110. See, e.g., Schroeder, supra note 69, at 1372 n.72; Note, JudicialIntegrity and Judicial
Review: An Argument for Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 UCLA L. REv.

1129, 1135 (1973).
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to an uncertain degree on speculation. Consequently, while some members of the Court argue that application of the exclusionary rule will
nourish and fortify public confidence in the judicial system, others argue
that, when application of the rule allows apparent criminals to go free,
the result is not public confidence, but frustration and bitterness.III Some
have seen an irony in the judicial integrity argument, because the exclusionary rule necessarily impairs the integrity of the truth-finding process. 112 The principle ofjudicial integrity has seldom been determinative
in the decision to apply the exclusionary rule in a particular proceeding, 113 and it has played an increasingly limited role in recent years because it has been overshadowed by the other two main considerations or
by more practical concerns. 114 As discussed below,"15 however, this
principle of judicial integrity assumes greater importance in the school
111. See, e.g., Burger (Chief Justice, United States Supreme Court), Who Will Watch the
Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. REv. 1, 22 (1964). This argument has, however, been challenged by
the assertion that countless variable factors affect the public attitude towards the justice system
and that disrespect may arise as much or more from the inability of the police to prevent crime
as from the exclusion of evidence. Goodpaster, supra note 81, at 1088.
112. See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980). Commentators have also
claimed that in addition to removing from the fact-finder's consideration what is nearly always
relevant and reliable evidence, the exclusion of evidence tends to lessen the accuracy and credibility of other admissible evidence by encouraging police to lie to avoid the rule. United States
v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447 n.18 (1976).
However, the truth-finding process retains a number of safeguards in the form of exceptions to the exclusionary rule that allow the admission of illegally obtained evidence. See, e.g.,
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 925-26 (1984) (police officer's good faith belief in validity
of defective warrant); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 800 (1984) (source of evidence
independent of illegal search and seizure); Havens, 446 U.S. at 627-28 (use to impeach any
statement by defendant on proper cross-examination reasonably suggested by direct examination); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, reh'g denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977) (discovery of evidence inevitable without aid of illegal search); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 720-24 (1975)
(use of inculpatory statement obtained before trial); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974) (grand jury proceeding). But see Janis,428 U.S. at 460 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (exception-making process amounts to "slow strangulation of the rule"). This list of exceptions is not
exhaustive.
113. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 3488-91 (1984); United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). But see
Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. at 3496 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (judicial integrity principle sufficient reason for exclusionary rule).
114. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976). Otherwise, a court would be forced to
exclude illegally obtained evidence even when the defendant does not object or consents to its
admission. Id. Similarly, application of the exclusionary rule raises issues of standing to claim
a fourth amendment violation. See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1980)
(public interest in truth-finding process justifies no standing although claimant will suffer by
admission of evidence obtained by violation of fourth amendment rights of another); Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (standing requires invasion of legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969) (same as
Payner). Thus, some fourth amendment violations clearly avoid judicial sanctions. See Goodpaster, supra note 81, at 1080.
115. See infra text accompanying notes 174-84.
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setting, in which a model of principled authority is essential to the commonly asserted goal of molding young minds and characters for future
citizenship.
Satisfactory Balance of Costs and Benefits

When analyzing whether the exclusionary rule should apply in a
given proceeding, the Court uses a balancing approach. While this approach is desirable because the policies and rationales underlying the rule
task of assigning
are not absolute, 1 6 it nonetheless entails the difficult
17
relative weight to each element in the balance."
Among the most significant costs of the exclusionary rule is the loss,
or the increased risk of loss, of a criminal conviction and the resulting
release of the accused. This cost is especially high when the crime involved is particularly violent or grievous. 1 8 Evidence indicates, however,
that few offenders released by application of the rule are dangerous.' 1 9
Further, other factors, such as judicial willingness to interpret the fourth
amendment restrictively, may tend to mitigate the risk that a dangerous
116. See supra note 82.
117. Some argue that the pendulum ofjudicial analysis has swung too far from absolutism.
See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 758-59 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("All of
these 'balancing tests' amount to brief nods by the Court in the direction of a neutral utilitarian
calculus while the Court in fact engages in an unanalyzed exercise of judicial will [and] doctrinally destructive nihilism."); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 633-34 (1980) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (balancing approach "completely freewheeling" and lacking "principles of decision that can be applied consistently and predictably").
118. Professor Tribe illustrates how this "visible and concrete" cost may have an artificially heavy weight when compared with "elusive, intangible, [and] diffuse" benefits such as
deterrence, individual security from unreasonable searches and seizures, and judicial integrity.
Tribe, supra note 96, at 157-58. Consider:
[P]roponents of cutting back the exclusionary rule ... claim that alternatives every
bit as effective.., will be found that will deter the illegal searches and seizures: the
threat of suing the police officer, for example, or altering the educational methods by
If they are right, then what happens? What hapwhich the police are trained ....
pens is that the illegal search and seizure is not committed at all. The police don't
find the evidence. The defendant is not arrested. The crime, you will notice, still
goes unpunished.
But the public doesn't see a visibly guilty suspect going free. No one sees the
suspect.... The public is less upset with the fourth amendment, less upset with the
only because the visible cost of letting the
courts-but only because it's fooled ....
known defendant go has been transmuted into the invisible cost of not picking him up
off the street in the first place.
The current Court is telling us that this deception is a benefit.
Id. at 166-67 (emphasis in original).
119. Some commentators claim that a disproportionate percentage of fourth amendment
violations occur in the context of "victimless crimes" such as gambling or possession of illegal
drugs or weapons. Oaks, supra note 87, at 681-85; Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the
Constable Blunders?. 50 TEx. L. REV. 736, 741 (1972); see also Kaplan, The Limits of the
Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1028 (1974).
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offender will be released.1 20
Another significant cost of the exclusionary rule is the loss of relevant and probative evidence and the consequent impairment of the truthfinding process. This cost, however, is mitigated by exceptions to the
exclusionary rule, which, for example, allow use of illegally obtained evidence in grand jury proceedings or at trial to impeach a defendant's credibility.1 21 Also, the actual detriment to the truth-finding process may be
illusory, since it is often true that, but for the constitutional violation, the
evidence would not have been obtained at all.1 22 When this is true, the
exclusionary rule is "simply the messenger [that] brings [the] bad news"
of fourth amendment violations. 123 The Court has endorsed assertions
that shifting the focus of a judicial proceeding from the ultimate question
of guilt or innocence to this subsidiary evidentiary issue further impairs
the truth-finding process1 24 and causes undue delay and consumption of
12 5
judicial resources.
Some claim that the exclusionary rule also increases the probability
that government officials will commit perjury to overcome the effects of
the rule. 126 However, this claim is highly speculative. 127 Moreover, the
incentive to commit perjury would seem to be the inevitable result of
attaching any meaningfully adverse consequence to a fourth amendment
violation. Remedies that might affect the personal or financial interests
1 28
of the offending officer could provide even stronger incentives.
Finally, some have argued that the exclusionary rule provides a de120. In serious cases, there are often other charges not weakened by the exclusionary
rule, or sufficient evidence of the crime charged apart from that unconstitutionally
seized. Moreover, the courts have shown a remarkable ability in the most serious
cases to stretch the legal doctrine to hold doubtful searches and seizures legal.
Kaplan, supra note 119, at 1036.
Justice Stewart has reported that, of cases declined for prosecution, only 0.4% of U.S.
Attorney cases (in 1979) and only 4.8% of California felony cases (in 1982) were declined on
the grounds of fourth amendment errors. Stewart, supra note 70, at 1394 nn.153-54.
121. For a partial list of exceptions to the exclusionary rule, see supra note 112.
122. Stewart, supra note 70, at 1392; Tribe, supra note 96, at 166-67.
123. Goodpaster, supra note 81, at 1082.
124. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-90 (1975).
125. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
126. See supra note 112 (possibility of perjury favoring prosecution); infra note 128 (favoring defendant).
127. "Implicit in this criticism is the suggestion that the [exclusionary] rule is so bad, so
contrary to the feelings and sensibilities of ordinary human nature regarding known criminals,
that even legally responsible people, such as police and judges, will not obey it." Goodpaster,
supra note 81, at 1091.
128. Any remedy, such as tort or criminal penalties, that imposes significant adverse effects upon the individual offending official presumably would be even more likely to encourage
perjury. Schroeder, supra note 69, at 1383 & n.175. "The opposite type of perjury, involving
collusion between police officers and defense attorneys to obtain acquittals of guilty defendants, also seems to exist." Id. (citing Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621, 673).
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fendant with a windfall benefit disproportionate to the magnitude of the
official's fourth amendment violation. 29 This argument assumes that the
rule is intended to compensate the victim for the governmental intrusion. 130 This assumption is flawed, however, as the cases expressly have
denied any intended compensatory effect.13'
The costs of the exclusionary rule must be balanced against the benefits of deterring future fourth amendment violations and maintaining
judicial integrity and public trust in government. Courts assign the relative weight to be given each element in the balance by considering the
facts presented, the policies to be served, and the nature of the proceeding. The next section examines how this balancing approach in cases
outside the criminal context has resulted in occasional application of the
exclusionary rule.
Applications of the Exclusionary Rule Outside the Criminal Context
When considering application of the exclusionary rule in noncriminal proceedings, the Supreme Court has used the balancing approach developed and applied in criminal proceedings.132 As a result of these
considerations, the extension of the exclusionary rule into civil proceedings has occurred slowly. 133 This is not surprising given the Court's recent decisions reflecting a growing dissatisfaction with the rule, even in
its original criminal context. 34 Nonetheless, the rule has been applied
outside the criminal context when it has clearly served the rule's underly129. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976); Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed.
Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 418-19 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
130. Stewart, supra note 70, at 1396.
131. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1973) ("The purpose of the
); Linkletexclusionary rule is not to redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim ....
ter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965) ("[T]he ruptured privacy of the victims' homes and
effects cannot be restored. Reparation comes too late.").
132. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 3486-90 (1984) (exclusionary rule
not applicable in civil deportation proceeding due to uncertain deterrent effect and existence of
alternative, intra-agency deterrent measures); id. at 3491 (White, J., dissenting) (rule would
apply in criminal or civil proceeding so long as its long-established deterrent purpose outweighs countervailing social costs); cf. id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (equal justification for the
rule in civil or criminal proceeding solely by virtue of fourth amendment mandates); id. at
3495-96 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (rule equally applicable in civil or criminal proceeding if it
serves "twin goals" of judicial integrity and public confidence in government and law).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 352 n.8 (1974) (dicta) ("Under
traditional principles," no standing to invoke rule in grand jury proceeding when claimant not
under indictment or criminal defendant); see also Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 1000
(D.N.H. 1976) (rule not applied in state technical institute's disciplinary proceedings because
"in most. . . Supreme Court exclusionary rule cases, the victim of the illegal search had been
a criminal defendant at one stage or another due to the search") (footnote omitted).
134. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2340 (1983) (White, J., concurring). For
further illustrations of recent exceptions to the reach of the exclusionary rule, see supra note
112.
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ing principles and intended functions. The determinative factors in this
exclusionary rule analysis have varied. For example, cases have focused
variously on the need to maintain the integrity of the truth-finding profound juscess,1 35 or the probability of deterrent effect, 136 or have simply
37
tification in the fundamental fourth amendment mandates.
A significant number of those cases have found the rule to be justified when certain elements are present to give the civil proceeding a character described as "quasi-criminal."' 138 This term describes proceedings
designed, like criminal proceedings, to impose punishment for an offense
against the law. 13 9 These cases rest on an analogy between criminal proceedings and the civil proceeding before the court: since both proceedings share punitive purposes and consequences, the civil defendant
should enjoy analogous criminal context safeguards. One such safeguard
is the exclusionary rule. The quasi-criminal character of a proceeding
14 °
has prompted some courts to impose the rule in various civil contexts,
such as a forfeiture proceeding, 14 1 a proceeding to assess taxes on illegal
goods, 142 proceedings arising from searches by administrative regulatory
135. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-52 (1974).
136. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984) (rule not applicable in deportation proceeding); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459-60 (1976) (rule not applicable
to fruits of search by state officers for use in federal tax proceeding); Midwest Growers Co-op
v. Kirkemo, 533 F.2d 455, 466 (9th Cir. 1976) (dicta) (must balance deterrence and nature of
ICC proceeding); Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 610-13 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 925 (1970) and 402 U.S. 961 (1971) (rule not applicable in sentencing hearing).
137. See, e.g., Savina Home Indust. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358, 1361-63 (10th
Cir. 1979) (dicta) (OSHA inspection); Knoll Assocs. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530, 533-36 (7th Cir.
1968) (dicta) (FTC search); Rogers v. United States, 97 F.2d 691, 692 (lst Cir. 1938) (assessment of customs duties); United States v. Stonehill, 274 F. Supp. 420, 425-26 (S.D. Cal. 1967)
(dicta), affid, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969) (tax proceeding).
138. See, eg., One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 (1965) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-34 (1886)).
139. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 (1965). One commentator explains:
Laws that provide for punishment but are civil rather than criminal in form have
sometimes been labeled "quasi-criminal" by the Supreme Court. These laws,
broadly speaking, provide for civil money penalties, forfeitures of property, and the
punitive imposition of various disabilities, such as the loss of professional license or
public employment.
Clark, Civil and CriminalPenaltiesand Forfeitures: A Frameworkfor ConstitutionalAnalysis,
60 MINN. L. REv. 379, 381 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
140. Cf NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360, 364 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 915 (1970) (rule inapplicable absent criminal procedure or sanction).
141. See, eg., One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 (1965) (forfeiture of auto seized for containing contraband).
142. See, eg., Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579, 586 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 986 (1969) (tax on illegal wagering activity); Lassoff v. Gray, 207 F. Supp. 843, 848 (W.D.
Ky. 1962) (same); Tovar v. Jarecki, 83 F. Supp. 47, 48 (N.D. Ill. 1948) (dicta), rev'd on other
grounds, 173 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1949) (tax on illegal drugs a penalty, not a tax).
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144
agencies,1 4 3 and a military employment discharge proceeding.
The Supreme Court has elucidated various factors that demonstrate
a punitive purpose behind a given proceeding. Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez 145 is a leading case on this issue. In Kennedy, a native-born
draftee had left the United States to evade military service. Pursuant to
federal immigration and nationality statutes, an administrative agency
rescinded his citizenship and deported him. The Court held the statutory provision for this sanction to be unconstitutional on the grounds
that the sanction was penal in nature and therefore could not be imposed
without providing the defendant with a criminal proceeding and its attendant procedural safeguards. 146
The Kennedy Court listed the factors by which a penal, or punitive,
proceeding may be identified. In essence, this identification process focuses on the character of the sanction that the proceeding seeks to impose. Under this analysis, a sanction will be punitive if: (1) it constitutes
an affirmative disability or restraint; 147 (2) it historically has been regarded as a punishment;148 (3) it is imposed for an offense that requires
49
scienter, or knowledge of the wrongful consequences of one's conduct; 1
50
(4) it promotes retribution and deterrence;
(5) it applies to behavior
143. See, e.g., Michigan v. Clifford, 104 S.Ct. 641, 649 (1984) (exclusionary rule applicable to search by fire department arson investigators); Todd Shipyards v. Secretary of Labor,
586 F.2d 683, 689-90 (9th Cir. 1978) (rule not applied retroactively to OSHA inspection findings).
When the exclusionary issue was not reached, the quasi-criminal character of the proceedings provided at least partial grounds for requiring a warrant in administrative regulatory
searches. The warrant was justified primarily by the need to protect fourth amendment interests regardless of the proceeding in which the illegally obtained evidence was ultimately used.
See, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311-13 (1978) (OSHA inspection); See v.
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967) (fire department inspection of commercial warehouse);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 531-40 (1967) (health department search of
residence).
144. See, e.g., Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (discharge of civilian
employee of military analogous to criminal sanction).
145. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
146. Id. at 186.
147. Id. at 168. "Affirmative disability or restraint" has not been formally defined by the
Court. Clark, supra note 139, at 455 n.224. It is reasonable to believe that any burden existing
solely as a result of governmental action falls within the meaning of the term. Id.
148. Kennedy. 372 U.S. at 168 ("[T]he traditional aims of punishment [are] retribution
and deterrence."); cf United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965) ("Punishment serves
several purposes: retributive, rehabilitative, deterrent-and preventive. One of the reasons
society imprisons those convicted of crimes is to keep them from inflicting future harm, but
that does not make imprisonment any the less punishment.").
149. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168.
150. Id.; see, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958) (loss of citizenship upon courtmartial conviction and dishonorable discharge for wartime desertion) ("If the statute imposes
a disability for the purposes of punishment-that is, to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter
others, etc.-it has been considered penal.").
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already chargeable as a crime; 15 1 (6) it could rationally be attributed with
52
an alternative, nonpunitive purpose, while remaining punitive in effect;1
and (7) it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose attrib15a
The Court recognized that, although each factor was releuted to it.
vant, each could "point in differing directions"'' 54 on the ultimate issue of
the punitive nature of the proceeding. The Court did not require that
each factor be present; rather, each factor is relevant and should be considered in relation to the statutory language and legislative intent.
Thus, the Court, though perhaps reluctantly, may make the exclusionary rule available in a civil administrative proceeding when it is clear
that the rule's primary considerations-the maintenance of judicial integrity, the deterrence of future violations, and a satisfactory balance of social costs and benefits-will be served. One such category of proceedings
is "quasi-criminal," in which the intended sanction is sufficiently punitive
to warrant the safeguard of the exclusionary rule. The next section examines the sanctions imposed in public school disciplinary proceedings
and determines that a limited category of those sanctions warrants the
availability of the exclusionary rule in the related proceedings.
The Exclusionary Rule in the Public School
Quasi-Criminal Nature of the Proceeding
Certain public school disciplinary sanctions can be identified as punitive in nature by applying the Kennedy v. Martinez-Mendoza15 5 sevenfactor analysis. The first factor, whether the sanction involves an affirmative restraint or disability, is present in suspension or expulsion sanctions. This conclusion rests on Goss v. Lopez,' 5 6 which held that
suspension deprives a student of his property interest in a public education and his liberty interest in his good reputation. 157 Under Goss, even a
one-day suspension would be an affirmative disability, and an expulsion
is therefore an even more severe deprivation.
The second factor in the analysis, whether the sanction historically
was regarded as punishment, is clearly present. Generally, all school disciplinary sanctions have been so viewed, 5 8 and this is especially true in
151. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168; see, eg., United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 294-96
(1935) (tax on illegal liquor sales).
152. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69; see, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960)
(when sanction imposed bears no rational connection to the purposes of the legislation of
which it is a part, it must without more be taken as evidencing a desire to punish); cf Clark,
supra note 139, at 482-83 (analogy to suspension of driver's license).
153. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 169.
154. Id.
155. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
156. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
157. Id. at 574; see supra notes 35-45 & accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., H. HUDGINS,JR. & R. VACCA, supra note 1, § 10.2, at 296.
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the case of suspensions and expulsions. 159
The third factor, whether the offense charged contains a scienter
element, will usually be present. Because school rules and regulations
frequently are published,1 60 students probably will be familiar with them.
Moreover, when enforcement of a rule will infringe a student's entitlement to an education, fourteenth amendment due process concerns may
prevent enforcement when the student has no knowledge or notice of the
regulation. Since Goss found that this entitlement was infringed by an
expulsion or even a one-day suspension, it can easily be inferred that the
scienter factor would be present in these sanctions.
The fourth factor in the Kennedy analysis, whether the sanction effectively promotes a retributive or deterrent purpose, is more problematic. When examining school disciplinary sanctions, it is helpful first to
eliminate the possibility of other purposes. Another purpose frequently
attributed to these sanctions is to educate the child in society's rules of
conduct and to modify his behavior accordingly.' 6' The validity of this
purpose as a justification for disciplinary sanctions is doubtful due to its
low potential for achievement. There are several reasons for this low
potential, especially in suspension and expulsion sanctions. Such a purpose assumes that these sanctions can and do significantly reduce a stu62
dent's potential for disorderly behavior when he returns to school.
However, considerable evidence indicates that these sanctions do not reduce misbehavior at all. 163 Rather, it seems more likely that any improvement in behavior results from the fear of future sanctions and thus
from punitive deterrence.
The fifth factor in the analysis, whether a sanction applies to behavior already chargeable as a crime, is easily identifiable. Clearly, this factor
will not be present in all suspension or expulsion proceedings. Students
frequently face these sanctions for relatively trivial, noncriminal miscon159. See Oversight on School Discipline, supra note 2, at 127 (statement of Dr. Irwin A.
Hyman).
160. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 763 n.16 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). However, disciplinary action need not be based on a written rule, since
student misconduct is often difficult to anticipate. See Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281,
1282 (1st Cir. 1970) ("[W]e would not wish to see school officials unable to take appropriate
action in facing a problem of discipline or distraction simply because there was no preexisting
rule on the books.").
161. H. HUDGINS, JR. & R. VACCA, supra note 1, at 296 (purpose to change student's
behavior); see supra note 42 & accompanying text (suspension as valuable educational device).
162. See Clark, supra note 139, at 482-83.
163. See, e.g., Oversight on School Discipline,supra note 2, at 53 (statement of Dr. William
Wayson) ("Practically all studies of suspension and corporal punishment show flagrant use of
these strong punishments for trivial or illogical matters and also show that they are used over
and over with the same students, demonstrating a lack of pedagogical effect."); id. at 127
(statement of Dr. Irwin A. Hyman) ("The overwhelming evidence tells us that punishment
and denial of justice are inappropriate, ineffective and counterproductive ways of changing and
improving behavior in our democracy.").
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duct.'" However, when school officials impose suspension or expulsion
for criminal conduct, such as possession of drugs or weapons, assault, or
arson, the school proceeding would be punitive under the Kennedy analysis regardless of whether the school officials intend subsequent referral to
a law enforcement agency.16 5 By virtue of their age, most juveniles are
precluded from being "criminals" as a consequence of penal law violations; rather, they are "delinquents" subject to the custodial and rehabilitative efforts of the juvenile court system. When school officials are
required by statute to report evidence of criminal activity to law enforcement officials, the risk of ultimate judicial punishment is especially
66

high.1

The sixth factor in the Kennedy analysis, whether an alternative,
nonpunitive, purpose can rationally be attributed to the sanction, has
been partially examined in connection with the fourth Kennedy factor. 167
That discussion showed that an educational purpose cannot rationally be
attributed to suspension and expulsion sanctions. Some have argued that
the purpose of these sanctions is to maintain a safe and stable learning
environment.1 68 Admittedly, this alternative purpose has more potential
for success than the purpose to educate. However, its assertion as the
primary purpose of the sanctions is weakened somewhat by the fact that
the presence of a preventive purpose and effect does not make the sanc69
tion any less punitive.
The final factor in the Kennedy analysis, whether a sanction appears
excessive in relation to the nonpunitive purpose attributed to it, requires
close examination. School officials may assert an educational purpose for
164. See supra notes 4 (typical school regulations) & 46 (suspension as primary formal
disciplinary sanction).
165. School officials are responsible for only three percent of the referrals to juvenile
courts. Amicus Brief for the National School Boards Association at 8, New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
105 S. Ct. 733 (1985) (citing REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JusTicE 60 (1983)).
Parents are responsible for the same percentage. Amicus Brief at 22. Evidently, schools are
attempting to deal with the problem of crime internally, through the usual procedures available to them. Id. at 8.
166. In many states, statutes require teachers and administrators to report evidence or
incidents of crime to the police. E.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48902 (West Supp. 1983); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-233g(b) (West. Supp. 1983); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 296-71 (Supp.
1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-21.7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-

6-4209) (1983). In other states, school officials who fail to report crime to the police are subject to personal criminal liability, usually a misdemeanor. ALA. CODE § 16-1-24 (Supp. 1983);
MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-37-17 (1973); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-21-2 (1981).

167. See supra text accompanying notes 161-63.
168. See, eg., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 742-43 (1984); Healy v. James, 408
U.S. 169, 189 (1972) (students have no right to cause substantial interference with other students' entitlement to educational opportunity).
169. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965) ("One of the reasons society
imprisons those convicted of crimes is to keep them from inflicting future harm, but that does
not make imprisonment any the less punishment.").
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sanctions: to teach the concepts of right and wrong and of personal responsibility for the consequences of one's misbehavior. This purpose
would be adequately served by a single, consistent, nonescalating sanction for every rule violation. An educational sanction need only identify
conduct as wrongful and impress upon the student some immediate
awareness that his conduct has harmed the interests of others. Accordingly, an escalating system of sanctions could serve only a subsidiary and
quite different purpose-to deter future violations and to punish. Therefore, the final Kennedy factor, an excessive sanction, would be present
when the sanction to be imposed is one of a range of sanctions escalating
in severity proportionate to the seriousness of the misconduct. Suspensions and expulsions, unless they are imposed for every rule violation,
would fall within this description.
Similarly, when school officials attribute a preventive purpose to a
disciplinary sanction, an escalating system of sanctions becomes increasingly punitive as the length of a suspension or expulsion increases. Admittedly, these sanctions would serve a preventive purpose: as long as a
student is kept outside the school, he cannot create disorder inside it.
Again, however, a sanction is no less punitive because it simultaneously
serves a nonpunitive purpose.
Therefore, when a school maintains an escalating system of disciplinary sanctions, those sanctions will be punitive when they exceed the
severity necessary either to teach the student that his behavior is wrong
and that he must take responsibility for its consequences or to prevent
recurrence of the misbehavior. This analysis, however, does not resolve
the remaining question of what sanction is "necessary" to serve these two
asserted purposes. It is reasonable to assume that a suspension of even
one day would have sufficient impact on a student to make the child
aware that his superiors view his conduct as undesirable and that misbehavior invites immediate and serious consequences. Goss recognized a
one-day suspension as a "serious event in the life of the suspended
child." 70 With respect to the preventive purpose, removing the student
from school for at least as much time as it took to commit the misdeed at
issue would be likely to prevent similar misconduct in the future. Simply
put, any removal from school would serve a preventive purpose. However, as noted, such a preventive purpose does not negate the existence of
a punitive one.
In sum, when a school, in response to a student's criminally chargeable conduct, chooses a suspension or expulsion from a range of escalating disciplinary sanctions, that sanction will be punitive under the
Kennedy analysis because a purely educational purpose cannot rationally
be attributed to it and because an asserted preventive purpose is not inconsistent with a punitive one.
170.

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975).
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As presaged by the Court in Kennedy, 17 1 examination of each factor
in the analysis has yielded varying conclusions as to the punitive, "quasicriminal" nature of public school disciplinary sanctions. Thus, while
examination of the first, second, third, and sixth factors indicates that all
school disciplinary sanctions are punitive, examination of the fourth,
fifth, and seventh factors indicates that only certain sanctions, namely
suspensions and expulsions for criminally chargeable conduct, fall within
this description. Under Kennedy, the quasi-criminal character of a proceeding is determined by the punitive character of the sanction it seeks to
impose. Accordingly, this analysis leads to the conclusion that a public
school disciplinary proceeding will be quasi-criminal when it seeks to impose an expulsion or a suspension of one day or more and when the misconduct being sanctioned is chargeable as a crime, regardless of whether
school officials refer the student to criminal law enforcement authorities.
When combined with the Goss v. Lopez 172 analysis, which concluded
that suspensions of more than ten days require at least rudimentary due
process safeguards for students, 173 the Kennedy analysis permits the following conclusions about the applicability of the exclusionary rule in
public school disciplinary proceedings. First, suspensions and expulsions are punitive sanctions, at least when they are not imposed for every
violation of any school regulation. Second, expulsions and suspensions
of more than ten days are serious deprivations of a student's property
and liberty interests. The Court has recognized that a student may have
a constitutional right to due process safeguards beyond mere notice and
opportunity for a hearing before these interests may be infringed. Third,
because expulsions and suspensions are normally punitive sanctions, the
proceedings which impose them are "quasi-criminal" and thus fall within
a category of noncriminal proceedings in which the Court has been willing to consider application of the exclusionary rule. The Court will not
apply that rule in such a proceeding unless doing so would serve the
rule's functions of deterring future fourth amendment violations and
maintaining judicial integrity and public respect for the law while achieving a satisfactory balance of social costs and benefits.
Against this background, this Note next argues for the application
of the exclusionary rule in the limited category of school disciplinary
proceedings that seek to impose a suspension of more than ten days or an
expulsion as a sanction for misconduct chargeable as a crime. The next
section examines the manner in which this application will serve the exclusionary rule's primary principles. Further, the Note argues that
school officials are capable of managing this application without unduly
171. Kennedy v. Martinez-Mendoza, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963).
172. 419 U.S. 565 (1975); see supra text accompanying notes 35-48.
173. Goss, 419 U.S. at 584.
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sacrificing their traditional discretion in disciplinary matters or disturbing the allocation of resources within the school system.
Maintenance and Promotion of Judicial Integrity

The educational setting demands the revitalization of the judicial
integrity rationale in the cost-benefit balance. Underlying this rationale is
the fundamental notion that members of the judiciary are essential role
models of respect for the law and for our democratic principles. Educators play a similar role in educating the young in good citizenship. 174 In
the school proceeding, the "judiciary" consists of professional educators,
most frequently administrators and local school board members and, less
frequently, teachers. Most educators consider the shaping of character
to be the school's primary task.175 While a child must learn to conform
his behavior to societal rules and to respect the rights of others, it is also
true that a child must learn that others, including adults, must also conform to these rules. Children learn as much by example as by exposition. 17 6 Since the vast majority of students are compelled by law to
attend school, 17 7 educators must take special care in the example they
8
7

set.1

Further, trust between students and school officials is essential to the
174. Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential to the meaningful
exercise of rights and responsibilities by a self-governing citizenry ....
The application of the exclusionary rule ... makes an important statement to young people that
"our society attaches serious consequences to a violation of constitutional rights,"
and that this is a principle of "liberty and justice for all."
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 760-61 (1985) (Stevens, J, concurring and dissenting)
(citations omitted); see also Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("[E]ducation
is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments."); West Va. State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) ("That [schools] are educating the young for
citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if
we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.").
175. "[T]he behavioral changes sought by schools are more pervasive in scope and more
subtle in nature than those worked by any other public institution.... Much of the message is
implicit in the school's environment[,] ... the school's structure, the behavior of teachers and
administrators, and its sanctioning resources." Kirp, supra note 7, at 854 (citation and footnotes omitted).
176. "It would be incongruous and futile to charge teachers with the task of embuing their
students with an understanding of our system of constitutional democracy, while at the same
time immunizing those same teachers from the need to respect constitutional protections."
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 750 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting);
Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223, 239 (E.D. Tex. 1980) (school officials as
models of responsible adult behavior).
177.

See supra note 1.

178. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 750 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) ("[G]overnment has a heightened obligation to safeguard students whom it compels to
attend school.").
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learning process, 179 and applying the exclusionary rule in the school context would aid this trust relationship. First, it would demonstrate to students that school authorities must respect individual constitutional rights
of personal privacy and security. Second, applying the exclusionary rule
will deter individual school officials from violating students' fourth
amendment rights. This would prevent the breach of existing individual
student-school official trust relationships. Without the exclusionary
sanction, both of these trust relationships and the dependent learning environment 8 0 could be irreparably debilitated by an unsanctioned fourth
amendment violation.
Another factor in the public school context which increases the importance of maintaining judicial integrity is the special relationship of the
school with its local community.""' Each school site has intensely local
and personal affiliations. Local school boards usually are elected bodies
which must be responsive to local community pressures. The typical
school-community relationship promotes the free flow of information, by
means of student reporting or regular public meetings, about the daily
activities and disciplinary policies of the school. In contrast, few police
officials are elected, and officers are largely isolated from public scrutiny. 8 2 In addition, the impact of disciplinary activity upon members of
the local community is more direct and personal than the law enforcement activity of the local police. When a student's criminally chargeable
misconduct within the school disrupts the educational environment and
school officials respond ineffectively or improperly, parents can see a direct threat to their children; the misconduct may threaten educational
opportunity or may pose a physical danger, as in the case of drug or
weapon possession. This threat is compounded by compulsory attendance laws and the practical difficulties of interschool transfer, which prevent removal or transfer of the child from the school.
179. Generating such trust is vital, because it evokes student "motivation to learn"
(whatever the content to be learned) independently of teacher demands for compliance. Yet [the trust relationship] ... is at best fragile, and may well be impossible to
attain if students begin to perceive pedagogical objectives as alien to their own
needs.... Out of felt necessity, teachers in settings in which student trust does not
naturally evolve come to substitute coercion-the use or the threat of power-for
suasion.
Kirp, supra note 7, at 855-56 (citation omitted).
180. "Peaceful or not, the educational prospects of schools run on the model of an authoritarian regime are dubious.... The resulting atmosphere is likely to prove incompatible with
either learning or teaching." Letwin, supra note 10, at 650.
181. The Court has previously recognized this special local community relationship with
the public school. As a justification for its refusal to impose due process requirements in the
matter of corporal punishment, the Court asserted that the "openness" of the school and supervision of it by the community are significant safeguards against abuse by school officials of
this disciplinary measure. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977).
182. See Milner, supra note 103, at 474.
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In contrast, the community relationship with the local police department is not often a close one, especially in large communities. Information on the daily activities of the police seldom reaches the community.
Unless a particular criminal investigation warrants press coverage, community members rarely hear of fourth amendment violations which
cause the release of a suspect. Even if they do hear of such violations, the
perceived personal threat is insignificant for two reasons. First, many in
the community may view the crime as victimless. 18 3 Second, the threat
is less immediate than in the school context, since the probability of personal or familial contact with the offender is lower in the greater community than in the closed school environment.
Thus, the special nature of the school-student relationship and the
school-community relationship increases the importance of maintaining
an image of judicial integrity in school disciplinary proceedings. Application of the exclusionary rule can aid in doing so. Accordingly, when
balancing the social costs and benefits of imposing the exclusionary rule
in the school context, the principle of judicial integrity should be revitalized as a substantial factor which may outweigh the importance currently afforded the principle of deterrent effect. This contention,
admittedly, is not easily susceptible to measurable verification under the
Court's "utilitarian calculus."' 1 84 However, the same limitation inheres
in the deterrence rationale currently favored by the Court.
Deterrence of Future Fourth Amendment Violations
In balancing the social costs and benefits of applying the exclusionary rule in a given proceeding, the probability and extent of the rule's
deterrent effect have often been determinative. This is so despite the
highly speculative nature of the analysis. To determine probable deterrent effect in the public school context, it is again helpful to examine
85
deterrence in its several modes: specific, general, and systemic.
First, consider the probabilities of specific deterrence. Commentators and members of the Supreme Court have argued that the exclusionary rule has no potential to create specific deterrence unless the result of
8 6
the proceeding is within the searcher's "primary zone of interest."'1
According to this argument, the searcher must have some personal interest in the successful sanctioning of the search victim, and it must be an
interest that would suffer if the exclusionary rule were applied. A suc183. See supra note 119 (disproportionate percentage of fourth amendment violations occur in the context of victimless crimes).
184. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 758 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also
Tribe, supra note 96, at 158 (individual security from fourth amendment violations and judicial
integrity and public confidence are "elusive, intangible and diffuse" benefits).
185. See supra notes 85-94 & accompanying text.
186. See supra note 90.
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cessful "prosecution" in a school disciplinary proceeding is within the
school official's primary zone of interest. As an educator, the official has
a keen interest in maintaining a learning environment free of danger and
distraction. Indeed, in some states, school officials are under a statutory
duty to maintain order and discipline. 87 This interest is not diminished
merely because the educator's primary aim may not be ultimate judicial
prosecution. He also has an interest in maintaining an image as a figure
of authority and guardian of the learning environment. The disciplinary
proceeding is a primary tool of the educator in this endeavor.
Additional factors indicate a higher probability of specific deterrence in the school context than in the law enforcement context. A substantial factor in this deterrence is the school official's much closer
personal involvement in all stages of the disciplinary process-from investigation through adjudication and its aftermath. For example, in
most cases, a police officer will be involved solely or primarily in the
investigative stage, appearing in court only briefly to introduce evidence. 188 He may only infrequently learn of an evidentiary exclusion or
of a related judicial statement of search and seizure guidelines. 89 His
superiors, who might so inform him and pressure him to improve his
performance, often have no systematic method by which they inform
themselves of judicial decisions. 90 Relevant information must be channeled through a complex three-tiered bureaucracy: the court, the prosecutor's office, and the police department.
In contrast, a school official receives greater feedback about his disciplinary activities. Unlike the three-tiered criminal justice system, the
school's administrative disciplinary process frequently occurs entirely
within the school or the local school district. 9 1 Far less bureaucratic
compartmentalization impedes the flow of relevant information. More187.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-203 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1629.2 (1980); FLA.

STAT. ANN. § 232.27 (West 1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 0-8.1-5-2 (Burns 1985); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 161.180 (Bobbs-Merrill 1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416 (West Supp.
1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-4-302 (1985); NEv. REV. STAT. § 391.270 (1985); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 18A:25-2 (West Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-10-5 (1984); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 115C-307(a) (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.58.201 (1982).

188.

Some commentators have suggested that police often view trial and conviction as

subsidiary to their law enforcement function. Milner, supra note 103, at 475-76, 479; Oaks,

supra note 87, at 720-36 (1970). This assertion has evoked judicial rebuttal. See, e.g., United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448 (1976) ("[Ihe entire criminal enforcement process ...is the
concern and duty of [police] officers .

. .

."); Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,

403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971) (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (police officer has essentially the same stake
in successful prosecution as prosecutor or public); cf INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 3479,
3490 (1985) (slight specific deterrence where arresting officers rarely attended formal hearing
or learned its results).
189. Burger, supra note 111, at 11; Goodpaster, supra note 81, at 1083; Wright, supra note
119, at 740.
190. See supra note 93.
191. See supra notes 4-7.
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over, the school adjudication process is far more expeditious than a criminal proceeding. 192 As a result, feedback on the propriety and
consequences of search activity is more immediate and relevant, even
though the offending searcher may not, beyond giving testimony, participate personally in the adjudication.
Another factor, related to the aftermath of the adjudication process,
may increase the probability of specific deterrence in the school context.
When a student avoids suspension or expulsion as a result of the exclusionary rule, compulsory attendance laws will keep him in school, in
close and prolonged proximity to the offending school official. In contrast, when a criminal defendant avoids conviction because of the exclusionary rule, nothing compels him to remain in any particular proximity
to the offending officer. For the school official, the student's presence provides a constant, direct, and highly personalized reminder of past error,
and therefore provides a strong incentive to avoid such errors in the
future.
Some commentators see little potential for the exclusionary rule to
create either general or systemic deterrence in the school disciplinary
context. They argue that, because many school officials remain mired in
traditional attitudes and practices, they will be sluggish or altogether unresponsive in implementing new due process mandates.193 However, this
argument assumes that less than immediate and vigorous adoption of
new legal directives is worthless. To the contrary, newly established
rights and freedoms commonly take slow and uneven effect, 194 and this is
surely no reason to devalue them.
The probability that application of the exclusionary rule will create
general deterrence is also greater in the school context than in the law
enforcement context. This is due, as with specific deterrence, to the
highly internalized nature of the school disciplinary process. This process provides school officials a high degree of access to information con192. See supra note 7.
193. See supra notes 10-11 (school officials' reactions to judicial decisions). Because state
regulation of teachers is pervasive, Respondent's Brief at 19, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct.
733 (1985), they may already be accustomed to due process mandates. However, since "most
states have not adopted statutory procedures to be followed by a school administrator or
school board before it suspends or expels a student," R. PHAY, LEGAL ISSUES IN PUBLIC
SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS 2 (NOLPE Monograph Series 1982), skepticism about
the schools' readiness to implement judicial directives may be justified.
194. For discussion of the manner in which establishment clause decisions have been received by public schools, see S. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT: SOME PERSPECTIVES 126-35 (1970); Birkby, The Supreme Court and the Bible Belt:
Tennessee Reactions to the Schempp Decision, in THE IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 110 (2d ed. 1973). For an extensive and detailed analysis of the impact of Supreme
Court decisions in preserving and expanding individual rights generally, see Choper, Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual ConstitutionalRights, 83 MICH. L.
REV. 1 (1984).
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cerning the consequences of search activity. Such substantial and
immediate feedback is essential to general deterrence for the same reasons-but with broader application-that it is needed to promote specific
deterrence.
Finally, a school system is more susceptible to effective systemic deterrence than is a police department. In the law enforcement context, the
prosecutor and the judiciary issue guidelines on fourth amendment mandates. However, they have no actual control over police procedures or
the individual officer's search conduct. Also, police department administrators promulgate internal rules of conduct while these administrators
may lack systematic access both to judicial guidelines and to rulings on
the conduct of subordinate officers. 195 Further, studies show that interillegal
nal departmental sanctions are rarely imposed on officers whose
196
search procedure has resulted in the exclusion of evidence.
In the school context, however, the "prosecutor" and the "judiciary" will be school board members or administrators. Because the whole
disciplinary process occurs within the school, they have systematic access
to relevant information. Moreover, these officials possess direct supervisory authority over the teachers or subordinate administrators who are
directly involved in evidence-gathering activities.
Satisfactory Balance of Costs and Benefits
When examining the advisability of applying the exclusionary rule
in a given proceeding, the Supreme Court balances the social costs of
applying the rule against its social benefits. Deterring future violations
and maintaining and promoting judicial integrity are among the most
highly valued benefits. This section examines some alleged costs of applying the rule in the school context.
First, as in the criminal context, a commonly feared cost of the exclusionary rule is the release of known offenders and the consequent decrease of effective rule enforcement. This concern is equally strong in the
school context, especially among those who see strong disciplinary sanctions as a valuable educational device.197 Analysis of this potential cost,
however, reveals that countervailing factors will mitigate decreased disciplinary effectiveness. First, one complaint frequently heard against the
fourth amendment's traditional "probable cause" standard is that it engenders legal hair-splitting about what satisfies the standard. This uncertainty, the argument goes, leads law enforcement officers to make
erroneous judgments on the issue. They may conduct wrongful searches
for evidence which is later excluded by a court or choose to refrain from
195. See supra note 93.
196. See supra note 89.
197. See supra note 42 & accompanying text (value of suspension as an educational
device).
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potentially valuable search activity for fear of breaking the law. As a
result of either choice, convictions are lost. But TL.O. 's substitution of
the reasonable suspicion standard 98 should quiet similar predictions for
the school context. 199 T.L. O. 's new standard of "reasonable suspicion" is
intentionally simple, requiring little more than common sense and reason
20 0
in its application.
Further, it is possible that school officials will evade the strictures of
the TL.O. decision, just as they devised means to evade Goss. 20 For
example, they may simultaneously charge a student with violation of several rules, proof of which does not require the illegally obtained evidence.
The school officials may simply drop the tainted charges and pursue the
others. "Prosecution" on the remaining charges requires little formality202 and will likely succeed. Suspension is readily available as a sanction. Consequently, the student may be removed from school, just as if
the tainted charges had not been dropped. In this situation, the violation
becomes moot; since the fourth amendment violation has not caused a
deprivation of rights or benefits, the student has no standing to
203
complain.

Some commentators have argued that the exclusion of evidence is a
windfall benefit to the student. 2°4 This argument prompts two responses.
First, the alleged windfall occurs most frequently in the criminal context
as a result of probable cause "technicalities." These technicalities will not
exist in the school context because of the new reasonable suspicion standard requiring no warrant or similar mechanism. Rather, TL. 0. requires
only that a search be initiated with a reasonable suspicion that it will
produce evidence that a rule or law has been or is being violated. 20 5
Once properly initiated, the search must then be reasonable in scope.
Second, exclusion will not be a disproportionate windfall because only
198. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
199. See, e.g., Amicus Brief for New Jersey School Boards Association at 21-22, New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
200. See supra text accompanying note 64. A similar rationale was applied in Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975), in establishing a standard of good faith immunity for
school officials for their unconstitutional conduct ("Such a standard imposes neither an unfair
burden upon a person assuming a responsible public office requiring a high degree of intelligence and judgment for the proper fulfillment of its duties, nor an unwarranted burden in light
of the value which civil rights have in our legal system.").
201. See supra note 46 (school measures to avoid due process mandates concerning short
suspensions).
202. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
203. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969) (no standing when claimant was not both the victim of the fourth amendment violation and the party against whom the
illegally obtained evidence is offered). Even so, the school will be able to perform its charactershaping function by using the facts discovered about the student's behavior as grounds for
special counselling or other remedial attention.
204. See supra note 129 & accompanying text.
205. See supra text accompanying note 63.
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the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence can return the student to his
pre-search condition.
Some have also argued that applying the exclusionary rule in the
school context will unduly divert valuable administrative and educational resources from the educational process. 20 6 But the adjudicative
forum now existing in most schools-the local school board-can accommodate adjudication of the exclusion issue without significant supplemental allocation of adjudicative resources. The school board has
traditionally reviewed troublesome disciplinary actions. 20 7 The board
will merely have to apply a simple, two-pronged test. First, it must decide if the disciplinary proceeding is one in which the exclusionary rule is
applicable. The guidelines proposed by this Note will sweep a small percentage of disciplinary cases within this category: cases in which there
was a search; 20 8 the behavior being sanctioned is already chargeable as a
crime; the proposed sanction is a suspension or expulsion of more than
ten days; and the student defendant has challenged the sanction and the
introduction of the illegally obtained evidence.
The second prong of the test analyzes whether the exclusionary rule
should be applied in a particular case. The standard to be applied will
require little more than reason and common sense. Specifically, the board
would have to decide whether the searcher had reasonable grounds to
suspect that the search would produce evidence of the alleged violation;
whether the scope of the search was reasonably related to this objective;
and whether the search was reasonably unintrusive in light of the student's age and sex and the nature of the alleged infraction. 20 9 If the
board answers any of these three questions in the negative, it must find
the search unreasonable and exclude the challenged evidence.
The proposed guidelines for application of the exclusionary rule focus on the nature of the student misconduct and the related sanctions
rather than on the nature of the intrusion into personal privacy. Admittedly, this approach adopts some of the "tangible effects" calculus criticized in connection with the deterrence rationale. 210 This approach,
however, is justified for three reasons. First, it provides guidelines easily
manageable by school officials. Second, it reflects the reasonable
probability that a search will be more aggressive and more intrusive of
fourth amendment interests when the suspected misconduct is more serious. 2 11 Third, some consensus has been reached among researchers that
the exclusionary rule is likely to deter future search violations in direct
206.
207.
208.
T.L.O.,

See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 592 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 5 & 7-8.
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari of The State of New Jersey at 8, New Jersey v.
105 S. Ct. 733 (1985). Notably, searches are conducted infrequently. Id.

209.
210.

See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
See supra text accompanying notes 102-06.

211.

See Buss, The FourthAmendment, supra note 24, at 756.
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proportion to the seriousness of the search victim's offense. 2 12

Accordingly, application of the exclusionary rule in the school context will serve the rule's underlying principles while maintaining a satisfactory balance of social costs and benefits.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's recent affirmation of fourth amendment rights
in the public school context is a significant and commendable step in its
halting journey toward the recognition of full constitutional protections
for public school students. However, judicial guidance is required on the
issue of what, if any, remedial mechanisms are available to students to
protect this newly acquired right.
This Note proposes that the exclusionary rule, traditionally available in criminal proceedings to exclude evidence obtained in searches violating fourth amendment interests in personal privacy and security,
should be available in a limited category of quasi-criminal public school
disciplinary proceedings. This category is confined to those proceedings
in which the sanctioned behavior is already chargeable as a crime and
when the proposed sanction is removal from school for more than ten
days. In these proceedings, the exclusionary rule's traditional rationales
of deterrence, judicial integrity, and an acceptable balance of social costs
and benefits will be satisfied. This approach has been followed by the
United States Supreme Court in other noncriminal proceedings.
The proposed guidelines may infringe upon only a narrow segment
of school disciplinary practices. Thus, public school officials will retain
their traditional discretion in a wide range of disciplinary activities while
contributing to a desirable uniformity of justice.
This proposal differs only in degree from traditional exclusionary
rule analysis by placing an increased value on the benefit of promoting
judicial integrity. This modification is prompted by the special nature of
the school context. As the Court has previously recognized, public
schools play a vital and central role in teaching our children essential
lessons in the importance of rules and good citizenship. A different lesson would be learned without some mechanism controlling the disciplinary zeal of school officials and preventing them from profiting from the
use of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment.
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See, Oaks, supra note 87, at 731.
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